Modern science considers itself scientific because it adheres to certain methodologies. It uses quantitative methods and measurable phenomena; its data is empirically derived and verifiable by others through experiments that are subject to replication; and, finally, its practitioners are impartial. Whereas ideological thinkers promulgate dogmas and defend them in the face of evidence to the contrary, scientists work with hypotheses which they modify when the evidence so dictates. When public relations recruits scientists to serve as "third party experts," however, the techniques of PR function as a "meta-methodology" that can have a corrupting influence on research.
PUBLICATION BIAS
The tobacco industry is well known for its PR manipulations of science, many of which have become public knowledge thanks to whistleblowers and lawsuits that have resulted in the public release of millions of pages of once-secret industry documents. In 1998, for example, documents came to light regarding an industrysponsored campaign in the early 1990s to plant sympathetic letters and articles in influential medical journals. Tobacco companies had secretly paid 13 scientists a total of $156,000 simply to write a few letters to influential medical journals. One biostatistician, Nathan Mantel of American University in Washington, received $10,000 for writing a single, eight-paragraph letter that was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Cancer researcher Gio Batta Gori received $20,137 for writing four letters and an opinion piece to the Lancet, the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, and the Wall Street Journal. The scientists didn't even have to write the letters themselves. Two tobacco-industry law firms were available to do the actual drafting and editing. In some cases, scientists were paid not just to write letters but entire scientific articles. In one case, the tobacco industry paid $25,000 to a single scientist to write an article for the publication Risk Analysis. The same fee went to former EPA official John Todhunter and tobacco consultant W. Gary Flamm for an article titled "EPA Process, Risk Assessment-Risk Management Issues" which they published in the Journal of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, where Flamm served as a member of the journal's editorial board. Not only did they fail to disclose that their article had been commissioned by the tobacco industry, journal editor C. Jelleff Carr later admitted he "never asked that question, 'Were you paid to write that?' I think it would be almost improper for me to do it." 3 The tobacco industry is hardly alone, however, in attempting to influence the scientific publishing process. A similar example of industry influence came to light in 1999 regarding the diet-drug combo fen-phen, developed by Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories. Wyeth-Ayerst had commissioned ghostwriters to write ten articles promoting fen-phen as a treatment for obesity. Two of the ten articles were actually published in peer-reviewed medical journals before studies linked fen-phen to heart valve damage and an often-fatal lung disease, forcing the company to pull the drugs from the market in September 1997. In lawsuits filed by injured fenphen users, internal company documents were subpoenaed showing that Wyeth-Ayerst had also edited the draft articles to play down and occasionally delete descriptions of side effects associated with the drugs. The final articles were published under the names of prominent researchers, one of whom claimed later that he had no idea that Wyeth had commissioned the article on which his name appeared. "It's really deceptive," said Dr. Albert J. Stunkard of the University of Pennsylvania, whose article was published in the American Journal of Medicine in February 1996. "It sort of makes you uneasy." 4 How does a doctor's name appear in an article without him knowing who sponsored it? The process involved an intermediary hired by Wyeth-Ayerst-Excerpta Medica, Inc.-which received $20,000 for each article. Excerpta's ghost writers produced firstdraft versions of the articles and then lined up wellknown university researchers like Stunkard and paid them honoraria of $1,000 to $1,500 to edit the drafts and lend their names to the final work. Stunkard says Excerpta did not tell him that the honorarium originally came from Wyeth. One of the name-brand researchers even sent a letter back praising Excerpta's ghostwriting skills. "Let me congratulate you and your writer on an excellent and thorough review of the literature, clearly written," wrote Dr. Richard L. Atkinson, professor of medicine and nutritional science at the University of Wisconsin Medical School. "Perhaps I can get you to write all my papers for me! My only general comment is that this piece may make dexfenfluramine sound better than it really is." 4 "The whole process strikes me as egregious," said Jerome P. Kassirer, then-editor of the New England Journal of Medicine -"the fact that Wyeth commissioned someone to write pieces that are favorable to them, the fact that they paid people to put their names on these things, the fact that people were willing to put their names on it, the fact that the journals published them without asking questions." Yet it would be a mistake to imagine that these failures of the scientific publishing system reflect greed or laziness on the part of the individuals involved. Naïveté might be a better word to describe the mindset of the researchers who participate in this sort of arrangement. In any case, the Wyeth-Ayerst practice is not an isolated incident. "This is a common practice in the industry. It's not particular to us," said Wyeth spokesman Doug Petkus.
"Pharmaceutical companies hire PR firms to promote drugs," agrees science writer Norman Bauman. "Those promotions include hiring freelance writers to write articles for peer-reviewed journals, under the byline of doctors whom they also hire. This has been discussed extensively in the medical journals and also in the Wall Street Journal, and I personally know people who write these journal articles. The pay is OK-about $3,000 for a six-to ten-page journal article." 5 Even the New England Journal of Medicine -often described as the world's most prestigious medical journal-has been involved in controversies regarding hidden economic interests that shape its content and conclusions. In 1986, for example, NEJM published one study and rejected another that reached opposite conclusions about the antibiotic amoxicillin, even though both studies were based on the same data. Scientists involved with the favorable study had received $1.6 million in grants from the drug manufacturer, while the author of the critical study had refused corporate funding. NEJM proclaimed the pro-amoxicillin study the "authorized" version, and the author of the critical study underwent years of discipline and demotions from the academic bureaucracy at his university, which also took the side of the industry-funded scientist. Five years later, the dissenting scientist's critical study finally found publication in the Journal of the American Medical Association, and other large-scale testing of children showed that those who took amoxicillin actually experienced lower recovery rates than children who took no medicine at all. 6 In 1989, NEJM came under fire again when it published an article downplaying the dangers of exposure to asbestos while failing to disclose that the author had ties to the asbestos industry. 7 In 1996, a similar controversy emerged when the journal ran an editorial touting the benefits of diet drugs, again failing to note that the editorial's authors were paid consultants for companies that sell the drugs. 8 In November 1997, questions of conflict of interest arose again when the NEJM published a scathing review of Sandra Steingraber's book, Living Downstream: An Ecologist Looks at Cancer. Authored by Jerry H. Berke, the review described Steingraber as "obsessed . . . with environmental pollution as the cause of cancer" and accused her of "oversights and simplifications . . . biased work . . . notoriously poor scholarship . . . . The focus on environmental pollution and agricultural chemicals to explain human cancer has simply not been fruitful nor given rise to useful preventive strategies . . . . Living Downstream frightens, at times misinforms, and then scorns genuine efforts at cancer prevention through lifestyle change. The objective of Living Downstream appears ultimately to be controversy." 9 Berke was identified alongside the review as "Jerry H. Berke, MD, MPH." The NEJM failed to disclose, however, that Berke was director of toxicology for W.R. Grace, one of the world's largest chemical manufacturers and a notorious polluter. A leading manufacturer of asbestos-containing building products, W.R. Grace has been a defendant in several thousand asbestos-related cancer lawsuits and has paid millions of dollars in related court judgments. It is probably best-known as the company that polluted the drinking water of the town of Woburn, Massachusetts, and later paid an $8 million out-of-court settlement to the families of seven Woburn children and one adult who contracted leukemia after drinking contaminated water. During the Woburn investigation, Grace was caught in two felony lies to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
In response to criticism of these lapses, NEJM editor Jerome P. Kassirer insisted that his journal's conflictof-interest policy was "the tightest in the business." 10 The sad fact is that this boast is probably correct. In 1996, Sheldon Krimsky of Tufts University did a study of journal disclosures that dug into the industry connections of the authors of 789 scientific papers published by 1,105 researchers in 14 leading life science and biomedical journals. In 34 percent of the papers, at least one of the chief authors had an identifiable financial interest connected to the research, and Krimsky observed that the estimate of 34 percent was probably lower than the true level of financial conflict of interest, since he was unable to check if the researchers owned stock or had received consulting fees from the companies involved in commercial applications of their research. None of these financial interests were disclosed in the journals, where readers could see them. 11 In 1999, a larger study by Krimsky examined 62,000 articles published in 210 different scientific journals and found only one half of one percent of the articles included information about the authors' research-related financial ties. Although all of the journals had a formal requirement for disclosure of conflicts of interest, 142 of the journals had not published a single disclosure during 1997, the year under study. 12 Corporate-sponsored scientific symposiums provide another means for manipulating the content of medical journals. In 1992, the New England Journal of Medicine published a survey of 625 such symposiums which found that 42 percent of them were sponsored by a single pharmaceutical sponsor. There was a correlation, moreover, between single-company sponsorship and practices which commercialize or corrupt the scientific review process, including symposiums with misleading titles designed to promote a specific brandname product. "Industry-sponsored symposia are promotional in nature and . . . journals often abandon the peer-review process when they publish symposiums," the survey concluded. 13 
DOES MONEY MATTER?
As these examples illustrate, many of the factors that bias scientific results are considerably more subtle than outright bribery or fraud. Scientists can be naïve about politics, PR, and other external factors shaping their work, and may become indignant at the suggestion that their results are shaped by their funding. But science does not occur in a vacuum. In studying animal populations, biologists use the term "selection pressure" to describe the influence that environmental conditions exert upon the survival of certain genetic traits over others. Within the population of scientists, a similar type of selection pressure occurs as industry and government support, combined with the vicissitudes of political fashion, determine which careers flourish and which languish.
The most dramatic trend influencing the direction of science during the past century has been its increasing dependence on funding from government and industry. Unlike the "gentleman scientists" of the nineteenth century who enjoyed financial independence that allowed them to explore their personal scientific interests with considerable freedom, today's scientists are engaged in expensive research that requires the support of sponsors with deep pockets. A number of factors have contributed to this change, from the rise of big government to the militarization of scientific research to the emergence of transnational corporations as important patrons of research. 14 The last quarter of the twentieth century in particular has seen increasing commercialization of science, as the rise of the so-called "knowledge-based" industries-computers, telecommunications, and biotechnology-prompted a wide variety of corporate research initiatives. In 1970, federal government funding for research and development totaled $14.9 billion, compared to $10.4 billion from industry. By 1997, government expenditures were $62.7 billion compared to $133.3 billion from industry. After adjusting for infla-tion, government spending had barely risen, while business spending more than tripled. 15 Much of this increase, moreover, took place through corporate partnerships with universities and other academic institutions, blurring the traditional line between private and public research. The 1980 enactment of Public Law 96-517, the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (more commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act) is frequently cited as landmark legislation that accelerated the emergence of corporate-academic partnerships by laying the legal groundwork for technology transfer from university laboratories to the commercial marketplace. Between 1981 and 1995, the proportion of U.S. industry-produced articles that were coauthored with at least one academic researcher roughly doubled, from 21.6 percent to 40.8 percent. The increase was even more dramatic in the field of biomedical research, where the number of coauthored articles quadrupled. 16 According to the Association of American Medical Colleges, corporate sponsorship of university medical research has grown from about 5 percent in the early 1980s to as much as 25 percent in some places today. 17 Corporate funding has transformed scientific and engineering knowledge into commodities in the new "information economy," giving rise to an elaborate web of interlocking directorates between corporate and academic boardrooms and an endless variety of university-industry partnerships and "technology transfers," from business-funded research parks to fee-forservice work such as drug trials carried out on university campuses. 18 "More and more we see the career trajectories of scholars, especially of scientists, rise and fall not in relation to their intellectually-judged peer standing, but rather in relation to their skill at selling themselves to those, especially in the biomedical field, who have large sums of money to spend on a well-marketed promise of commercial viability," observed Martin Michaelson, an attorney who has represented Harvard University and a variety of other leading institutions of higher education. "It is a kind of gold rush," Michaelson said at a 1999 symposium sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. "More and more we see incentives to hoard, not disseminate, new knowledge; to suppress, not publish, research results; to titillate prospective buyers, rather than to make full disclosure to academic colleagues. And we see today, more than ever before, new science first-generally, very carefully, and thinly-described in the fine print of initial public offerings and SEC filings, rather than in the traditional, fuller loci of academic communication." 19 Industry-academic entanglements can take many forms, some of which are not directly related to funding for specific research. Increasingly, scientists are being asked to sit on the board of directors of forprofit companies, a service which requires relatively little time but can pay very well-often in excess of $50,000 per year. Other private-sector perks may include gifts to researchers of lab equipment or cash, or generous payment for speeches, travel, and consulting. The benefits that come with these sorts of arrangements are self-evident. The downside, however, is that corporate funding creates a culture of secrecy that can be chilling to free academic inquiry. Businesses frequently require scientists to keep "proprietary information" under wraps so that competitors can't horn in on their trade secrets.
In 1994 and 1995, researchers led by David Blumenthal at the Massachusetts General Hospital surveyed more than 3,000 academic researchers involved in the life sciences and found that 64 percent of their respondents reported having some sort of financial relationship with industry. They also found that scientists with industry relationships were more likely to delay or withhold publication of their data. Their study, published by the Journal of the American Medical Association, found that during the three years prior to the survey, 20 percent of researchers reported delaying publication of their research results for more than six months. The reasons cited for delaying publication included the desire to patent applications from their discovery and a desire by some researchers to "slow the dissemination of undesired results." The practice of withholding publication or refusing to share data with other scientists was particularly common among biotechnology researchers. 20 "It used to be that if you published you could ask about results, reagents-now you have these confidentiality agreements," said Nobel Prize-winning biochemist Paul Berg, a professor of biochemistry at Stanford University. "Sometimes if you accept a grant from a company, you have to include a proviso that you won't distribute anything except with its okay. It has a negative impact on science." 21 The problem of secrecy in science is particularly troubling when it involves conflicts of interest between a company's marketing objectives and the public's right to know. When research results are not to a sponsor's liking, the company may use heavy-handed tactics to suppress them-even if doing so comes at the expense of public health and the common good.
One such case came to light in 1997 regarding the work of Betty Dong, a researcher at the University of California. In the late 1980s, the Boots Pharmaceuti-cal company took an interest in Dong's work after she published a limited study which suggested that Synthroid, a thyroid medication manufactured by Boots, was superior to drugs produced by the company's competitors. Boots offered $250,000 to finance a largescale study that would confirm these preliminary findings. To the company's dismay, however, the larger study, which Dong completed in 1990, contradicted her earlier findings and showed that Synthroid was no more effective than the cheaper drugs made by Boots's competitors. What followed was a seven-year battle to discredit Dong and prevent publication of her work. The contract which Dong and her university had signed with the company gave it exclusive access to the prepublished results of the study as well as final approval over whether it would ever be published. The study sat on the shelf for five years while Boots waged a campaign to discredit Dong and the study, bombarding the chancellor and other university officials with allegations of unethical conduct and quibbles over the study's method, even though the company itself had previously approved the method. In 1994, Dong submitted a paper based on her work to the Journal of the American Medical Association. It was accepted for publication and already set in type when the company invoked its veto right, forcing her to withdraw it. 22 In 1995, Boots was purchased by Knoll Pharmaceutical, which continued to suppress Dong's conclusions. While she remained unable to publish her own results, Knoll published a reinterpretation of her data under the authorship of Gilbert Mayor, a doctor employed by the company. Mayor published his reanalysis of Dong's data without acknowledging her or her research associates, a practice that JAMA would later characterize as publishing "results hijacked from those who did the work." 22 After further legal battles and an exposé of Knoll's heavy-handed tactics in the Wall Street Journal, Dong was finally allowed to publish her own version of the study in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1997-nearly seven years after its completion. During those seven years, Boots/Knoll had used claims of Synthroid's superiority to dominate the $600-million-per-year synthetic thyroid market. The publication of her work in JAMA prompted a class-action lawsuit on the part of Synthroid users who had been effectively duped into paying an estimated $365 million per year more than they needed for their medication. Knoll settled the lawsuit out of court for $98 million-a fraction of the extra profits it had made during the years it spent suppressing Dong's study. 23 Another attempt to suppress research occurred in 1995, when liver specialist Nancy Olivieri at the University of Toronto wanted to warn patients about the toxic side effects of a drug she was testing. The Canadian drug giant Apotex, which was sponsoring the study in hopes of marketing the drug, told her to keep quiet, citing a nondisclosure agreement that she had signed. When Olivieri alerted her patients anyway and published her concerns in the New England Journal of Medicine, Apotex threatened her with legal action and she was fired from her hospital, a recipient of hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in research funding from Apotex. 24 In 1997, David Kern, an occupational health expert at Brown University, discovered eight cases of a new, deadly lung disease among workers at Microfibres, Inc., a manufacturer of finely-cut nylon flock, based in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Microfibres tried to suppress Kern's finding, citing a confidentiality agreement that he had signed at the time of an educational visit to the company more than a year before the start of his research. When Kern spoke out anyway, administrators at the hospital and university where he worked (a recipient of charitable contributions from Microfibres) insisted that he withdraw a previously submitted scientific communiqué about the disease outbreak and that he cease providing medical care to his patients who worked at the company. Kern's program-the state's only occupational health center-was subsequently closed, and his job was eliminated. 25 Even more disturbing was the response of many of his research colleagues. "There were courageous folks who stood up for me, but most looked the other way," he said. "I'm mightily discouraged by the failure of the community to do more." 26 Beyond the problem of outright fraud and suppression, moreover, there is a larger and more pervasive problem: the systemwide bias that industry funding creates among researchers in commercially profitable fields. "Virtually every academic in biotechnology is involved in exploiting it commercially," observed Orville Chapman of the University of California at Los Angeles. "We've lost our credentials as unbiased on such subjects as cloning or the modification of living things, and we seem singularly reluctant to think it through." 27 A host of techniques exist for manipulating research protocols to produce studies whose conclusions fit their sponsor's predetermined interests. These techniques include adjusting the time of a study (so that toxic effects do not have time to emerge), subtle manipulations of target and control groups or dosage levels, and subjective interpretations of complex data. Often such methods stop short of outright fraud, but lead to predictable results. "Usually associations that sponsor research have a fairly good idea what the outcome will be, or they won't fund it," says Joseph Hotchkiss of Cornell University. When researchers have examined the link between funding sources and research outcomes, they have found a striking pattern of correspondence:
• In 1994, researchers in Boston studied the relationship between funding and reported drug performance in published trials of anti-inflammatory drugs used in the treatment of arthritis. They reviewed 56 drug trials and found that in every single case, the manufacturer-associated drug was reported as being equal or superior in efficacy and toxicity to the comparison drug. "These claims of superiority, especially in regard to side effects, are often not supported by the trial data," they added. "These data raise concerns about selective publication or biased interpretation of results in manufacturer-associated trials." 28 • In 1996, researchers Mildred K. Cho and Lisa A.
Bero compared studies of new drug therapies and found that 98 percent of the studies funded by a drug's maker reached favorable conclusions about its safety and efficacy, compared to 76 percent of studies funded by independent sources. 29 • In 1998, the New England Journal of Medicine published a study that examined the relationship between drug-industry funding and research conclusions about calcium-channel blockers, a class of drugs used to treat high blood pressure. There are safety concerns about the use of calciumchannel blockers because of research showing that they present a higher risk of heart attacks than other older and cheaper forms of blood pressure medication such as diuretics and betablockers. The NEJM study examined 70 articles on channel blockers and classified them into three categories: favorable, neutral and critical. It found that 96 percent of the authors of favorable articles had financial ties to manufacturers of calcium-channel blockers, compared with 60 percent of the neutral authors and 37 percent of the critical authors. Only two of the 70 articles disclosed the authors' corporate ties. 30 • In October 1999, researchers at Northwestern University in Chicago studied the relationship between funding sources and conclusions reached by studies of new cancer drugs and found that studies sponsored by drug companies were nearly eight times less likely to report unfavorable conclusions than studies paid for by nonprofit organizations. 31 Drug research is not the only field in which this pattern can be detected. In 1996, journalists Dan Fagin and Marianne Lavelle reviewed recent studies published in major scientific journals regarding the safety of four chemicals: the herbicides alachlor and atrazine, formaldehyde, and perchloroethylene, the carcinogenic solvent used for dry cleaning clothes. When nonindustry scientists did the studies, 60 percent returned results unfavorable to the chemicals involved, whereas industry-funded scientists came back with favorable results 74 percent of the time. 32 
SOLUTIONS
Recognizing the problem of funding-driven bias, leading medical journals recently announced the adoption of a uniform policy that reserves the right to refuse to publish drug company-sponsored studies unless the researchers involved are guaranteed scientific independence. Hopefully, this announcement from the New England Journal of Medicine, the Lancet, the Annals of Internal Medicine, and the Journal of the American Medical Association will serve as a signal for other journals to adopt similar policies. It must be emphasized, however, that mere promulgation of policies is meaningless unless those policies are actually implemented. Unfortunately, medical journals "are doing poorly in adhering to their own guidelines," according to a September 22, 2001 report in the British Medical Journal, which cited research by Ana Gupta from Yale University into actual compliance with the Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts to Biomedical Journals, whose policies regarding sponsorship disclosure have been formally adopted by more than 500 journals. "Gupta and her fellow contributors examined whether these requirements were met in 268 ramdomized controlled trials published by the Annals of Internal Medicine, BMJ, JAMA, the Lancet, and the New England Journal of Medicine," the BMJ reported. "The type and degree of the involvement of the funding source was disclosed in only 8% of cases, and all these disclosures were in the Annals of Internal Medicine. The other journals, including the BMJ, failed completely to disclose the nature of the involvement. . . . Frank Davidoff, former editor of the Annals, explained that he had been sensitized to this issue after one set of authors repeatedly failed to tone down their conclusions despite editorial requests. When Davidoff phoned to ask why, they explained that the unidentified sponsors didn't want them to do so." 33 In addition, moreover, researchers and medical journals should adopt stricter standards of disclosure regarding funding itself. Some researchers bridle at this expectation. When asked who funds their research, they may argue that this question is irrelevant or that merely asking the question casts aspersions on their integrity. Individual integrity, however, is not the real issue. There is nothing inherently wrong with research sponsored by companies with a vested interest in its outcome. Nevertheless, neither researchers nor the sponsors of their research can be expected to be completely objective or to recognize their own bias if it exists. Funding does not necessarily create bias, but it selects bias and is a leading indicator of bias. For this reason alone, a researcher's funding and other possible financial conflicts of interest are important information that should be published as routinely as study methodologies and statistical confidence levels. Funding itself may not taint a researcher's integrity, but lack of candor about funding should be regarded as an ethical breach, and both researchers and scientific journals should work to foster a culture of expectations in which full and frank disclosure of such ties becomes the norm rather than the exception.
In addition to greater disclosure in individual medical journals, further empirical research is needed to determine the extent and nature of the influence that funding exerts upon research. The studies that we have cited in this paper provide some illumination, but many questions need further study. To what extent does industry sponsor research in specific fields? How and to what extent does funding determine the nature of the research questions that scientists are pursuing, as well as the conclusions drawn from scientific data? How does corporate funding influence the institutional practices of public and private research universities and colleges? Anecdotal evidence exists to help answer these questions, but systematic research might provide better answers.
Finally, it is important to maintain an "information commons"-space for research funded by nonprofit organizations, universities and governmental bodies. Research by these institutions may carry its own political agendas, but it is an important alternative and counterweight to proprietary, profit-driven research. Historically, an information commons has been maintained by the expectation that the end goal of research is publication and that, once published, results become common property of the entire community. The expectations for proprietary information are different. Copyright and patent laws exist precisely to ensure that inventors, researchers, and writers can benefit commercially from their work product. Corporateacademic partnerships have created a peculiar chimera: research which is often supported in part by public funding, but which then becomes the property of private individuals. There are good reasons to encourage private research, but it must not be allowed to crowd out or compromise the integrity of publiclyfunded, publicly-owned research. Moreover, laws, contractual clauses, and normative pressures can and should be used to encourage the open publication and dissemination of all research, whether public or private, that has a bearing on public health. Just as medical journals can encourage scientific integrity by adopting policies that strengthen the independence of researchers, academic institutions have a major impact through the contracts they negotiate and the professor-industry relationships they tolerate on campus.
The problem of funding-driven bias is hardly new, and it is not a problem that can be eliminated. The meta-methodology of public relations intentionally creates conflicts of interest and exploits them for the commercial advantage of private clients. In some form or another, the incentive to engage in these sorts of manipulations will exist as long as private industries are engaged in privately-sponsored research with the objective of earning profits. This problem cannot be eliminated, but it can be managed. Transparent disclosure of funding will not eliminate the possibility of research bias, but disclosure can help the public to recognize bias when it exists. An "information commons" does not eliminate research bias either, but it can at least ensure that alternate, independent voices exist and have a chance to be heard.
